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YET ANOTHER PROOF OF GO¨DEL’S COMPLETENESS
THEOREM FOR FIRST-ORDER CLASSICAL LOGIC
MARCO B. CAMINATI
Abstract. A Henkin-style proof of completeness of first-order classical
logic is given with respect to a very small set (notably missing cut rule)
of Genzten deduction rules for intuitionistic sequents.
Insisting on sparing on derivation rules, satisfiability theorem is seen
to need weaker assumptions than completeness theorem, the missing
request being exactly the rule ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ, which gives a hint of intuition-
ism’s motivations from a classical point of view.
A bare treatment of standard, basic first-order syntax somehow more
algebraic-flavoured than usual is also given.
1. Introduction
Some twenty years after Go¨del gave the first proof of its completeness
result (see [4] for an english translation of the original paper), Henkin ([2])
found a substantially different strategy to prove it, giving an alternative
approach which has become standard in the exposition of the subject, see
for example [1].
The latter treatment inspired the present one. In particular the proof
mechanism of 3.0.10 is unchanged.
What has been changed is the derivation of 3.0.9, which is the main result; it
is given in a quite different way, attentive to the economy of derivation rules.
As a consequence, it is shown that satisfiability theorem, which is the key
for completeness in all the arguments known to author (Go¨del’s included),
requires one rule less than completeness.
In other words, the rule set large enough to prove any true statement has
one rule more than the rule set large enough that it can be enlarged with-
out making any consistent set of formula inconsistent: compare 3.0.11 with
3.0.12.
And anyway, the completeness theorem can inherently be proven according
to a set of basic deduction rules (listed in 2.1) which lacks “Proof by cases”
rule, and then cut-rule, which is derived from it (see [1], IV.3.2), right from
the start.
As a byproduct, this led to a careful reformulation of consistency-related
definitions, and to a generalization of the construction of Henkin for the
model of a given consistent set of formula to the generic free interpretation
and quotient construction ((9) and (11)).
Further, a reformulation of first-order logic syntax and semantics in term of
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semigroups is given in B and C. A plus of this approach is that definitions
and some proofs get shorter and compact, albeit arguably obscuring the in-
tuitive meaning of things, which is what standard treatment is based on.
All these addictional results are relegated to appendix so as not to obscure
the main result.
For yet alternative proofs of this same cornerstone result, the reader can see
[6] or [5].
2. Sequents
In sections B and C, syntax and semantics have been formalized. Here
a formalization of deductive proofing is set up. All along the tractation of
completeness theorem, we fix the symbols set S and the variable symbols
set X and explicitly require them both to be at most countable.
2.1. Basic derivation rules. Let Γ ⊆ FS be finite.
2.1.1. Assumption. Rule number 0
Γ ϕ where {ϕ} ⊆ Γ
2.1.2. Antecedent. Rule number 1
Γ ϕ
Γ′ ϕ
where Γ ⊆ Γ′
2.1.3. Reflexivity of Equality. Rule number 2
≡ tt
2.1.4. Substitution through Equality. Rule number 3
Γ ϕ t
x
Γ ≡ tt′ ϕ t
′
x
2.1.5. Quantifier Introduction in succedent. Rule number 4
Γ ϕ t
x
Γ ∃xϕ
2.1.6. Quantifier Introduction in antecedent. Rule number 5
Γ ϕx
′
x
ψ
Γ ∃xϕ ψ
where x′ ∈ X \ free (Γ ∪ {∃xϕ,ψ})
2.1.7. NOR introduction. Rule number 6
Γ ↓ ϕ1ϕ1
Γ ↓ ϕ2ϕ2
Γ ↓ ϕ1ϕ2
2.1.8. NOR simmetry. Rule number 7
Γ ↓ ϕ1ϕ2
Γ ↓ ϕ2ϕ1
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2.1.9. Contradiction +. Rule number 8
Γ ϕ ψ
Γ ϕ ↓ ψφ
Γ ↓ ϕϕ
2.1.10. Contradiction -. Rule number 9
Γ ↓ ϕϕ ψ
Γ ↓ ϕϕ ↓ ψφ
Γ ϕ
2.2. Correctness. Compact notation for rules selection. The rules
given in 2.1 have a role similar to that of construction rules for FS and
T S seen in B.2: the former decree which sequents are admitted in proofs,
the latter ruled what strings of symbols are accepted to make computations
on, and were built with syntactical conformity in mind, so to filter exactly
the formulas that other authors call well-formed to emphasize the point.
Correspondingly, the first requisite one expects from derivation rules is that
any formula derived from true assumption must be true as well, i.e. that
basic derivation rules are correct. Checking that this is indeed the case for
our basic rules is straightforward but tedious; let us just state a fundamental
consequence:
Theorem 2.2.1 (Consistency theorem). Any satisfiable set of formulas is
consistent.
Formal definition of consistency is to come in 2.4, anyway this should not
pose a problem for some informal motivational discussion. The proof of 2.2.1
is much easier than that of its reverse (satisfiability theorem, 3.0.10), which
is done below. A first symptom of the trickiness involved: if one looks at
2.2.1’s statement, there’s no ambiguity in it, in that the declared consistency
holds irrespective of the deduction rules adopted; one can add or subtract
arbitrary deduction rules and, provided they are correct, 2.2.1 stands still.
On the other hand, if faced with statement “Any consistent set of formulas
is satisfiable”, one may well, and should, ask: “Consistent according to what
derivation rules?”.
We shall later see, indeed, that every basic rule (except 2.1.10 which is
used only for the easy derivation, from 3.0.10, of the stronger completeness
theorem, 3.0.12) is needed along the proof, and this results in having to get
fussy about always specifying according to which rules one is deriving.
In particular, satisfiability theorem need all-around consistency for its thesis
to hold, and is not granted to stand for weaker-consistent sets of formulas,
simply because of the inability of finding some proof dispensing one of the
basic rules.
So we need a compact way to always specify which rules are assumed at
each stage of the work. The letter D will denote the generic subset of the
set of basic rules provided in 2.1.
Having enumerated each member of the latter permits to bijectively denote
each member of its power set with a binary string of 10 digits. That is, each
subset of basic rules can be associated with a natural number less than 1024.
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For example the rule set
D := {Reflexivity of Equality,NOR introduction,Assumption}
can be identified with the number 69.
With a handy notational abuse, one can thus write relations like D ⊇ 3 to
compactly state that he is considering a set of rules D including at least
Assumption and Antecedent.
Finally, D will be the set of all the rules derivable given the starting rule set
D.
2.3. Some derivable rules. Here are some derivable rules for our conve-
nience in future arguments. Their derivation is omitted in most cases, being
short and easy.
If D ⊇ 259 then D contains the following rule:
Γ ↓ ϕ1ϕ2
Γ ↓ ϕ1ϕ1
NOT introduction
If D ⊇ 387 then D contains the following rule:
Γ ↓ ϕ1ϕ2
Γ ↓ ϕ2ϕ2
NOT introduction
If D ⊇ 515 then D contains the following rule:
Γ ¬¬ϕ
Γ ϕ(1)
If D ⊇ 515 or D ⊇ 259 then D contains the following rule:
Γ ϕ
Γ ¬¬ϕ
Proof. We do the case D ⊇ 515: the sequent Γϕ is given, and Γ¬¬¬ϕ¬¬¬ϕ
is introduced by 2.1.1. Apply respectively 2.1.2 and (1) to trigger this deriva-
tion:
Γ ¬¬¬ϕ ϕ
Γ ¬¬¬ϕ ¬ϕ
Γ ¬¬ϕ
by (2.1.10)

2.4. First properties of sequents. Consistency. We continue to use D
to indicate a generic subset of basic rules, and study the scope of derivations
when varying which rules we admit in D.
Definition 2.4.1. The letter D shall be overloaded to denote with D (Φ)
the logical expansion of Φ according to D, that is the set of formulas
D (Φ) :=
{
ϕ ∈ FS |Φ ⊢D ϕ
}
Φ is said to be D-expanded iff D (Φ) ⊆ Φ.
Obviously D (Φ) = D (Φ), since derivable rules are just handy placehold-
ers replaceable with a full derivation, similar to the concept of macro in
computer science.
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The following definitions characterize a set of formulas according to its
logical properties, and complete the definitions given in B.4, which pursued
the same task in a sheer syntactical manner.
Definition 2.4.2. One says that Φ is D-consistent, and writes ConD Φ, iff
∀ϕ ∈ FS , {ψ|Φ ⊢D ψ} ∩ {ϕ, ↓ ϕϕ} has cardinality not exceeding 1. Equiva-
lently, D (Φ) is not patently inconsistent.
Definition 2.4.3. Φ is said to beD-maximal iff it is aD-consistent covering.
In making use of above definitions we shall often elide the D letters when
there is no reasonable ambiguity possible.
Lemma 2.4.4. If D includes assumption rule, then
(1) Φ is maximal ⇔ Φ is a minimal covering and Φ is expanded.
(2) Φ is maximal ⇒ (ConΦ and (ConΦ ∪ {ϕ} ⇒ ϕ ∈ Φ))
(3) Φ ⊆ D (Φ)
Proof.
(1) ⇒ direction:: Φ being a covering implies Card {ϕ, ↓ ϕϕ} ∩Φ ≥
1, while it being consistent implies, using assumption rule, that
same cardinality being ≤ 1.
Suppose Φ ⊢ ϕ. By contradiction, ↓ ϕϕ cannot be in Φ, for if
it were then, by assumption rule, Γ ⊢↓ ϕϕ, which would violate
consistency. Thus ↓ ϕϕ /∈ Φ which, minimal covering property
having already been ascertained, implies ϕ ∈ Φ.
⇐ direction:: It all reduces to showing that Φ is consistent:
Φ ⊢ ϕ⇒ ϕ ∈ Φ⇒↓ ϕϕ /∈ Φ⇒ Φ 6 ⊢ ↓ ϕϕ,
where middle deduction uses minimal covering hypothesis, while
external ones both use expansion hypothesis. No deduction rule
was needed, which is remarkable.
(2) Assuming LHS of last thesis, consistency and assumption rule give
↓ ϕϕ /∈ Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⇒↓ ϕϕ /∈ Φ. So ϕ ∈ Φ, being the latter a minimal
covering.
(3) Obvious.

Lemma 2.4.5. D ⊇ 258, Φ ⊆ FS and ϕ ∈ FS. Then
(1) Not ConΦ ∪ {ϕ} ⇒ Φ ⊢↓ ϕϕ
(2) Φ ⊢ ϕ and ConΦ⇒ ConΦ ∪ {ϕ}
Proof.
(1) There are ψ ∈ FS , Γ′ ⊆ Φ ∪ {ϕ}, Γ′ finite such that ⊢ Γ′¬ψ and
⊢ Γ′ψ.
This can be restated as ⊢ Γϕψ and ⊢ Γϕ ↓ ψψ, with Γ ⊆ Γ′ ∩ Φ; by
2.1.2 Γ can be made non-empty, so using 2.1.9:
Γ ϕ ψ
Γ ϕ ↓ ψψ
Γ ↓ ϕϕ
yielding ⊢ Γ ↓ ϕϕ, i.e. Φ ⊢↓ ϕϕ.
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(2) The hypothesis implies Φ 6⊢↓ ϕϕ which, using previous point, gives
ConΦ ∪ {ϕ}.

Remark 2.4.6. If D ⊇ 258 or D ⊇ 514, then
ConD Φ⇔ there is ϕ ∈ F
S |Φ 6⊢D ¬ϕ
The easy proof is omitted.
Definition 2.4.7 (Maximization constructions). Given a set of rules D and
an enumeration α of FS (so that FS = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . .}, where ϕj := α (j)),
define, for any Φ ⊆ FS:
Φ0 := Φ Φ
′
0 := Φ,
and then recursively for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
Φj :=
{
Φj−1 ∪ {ϕj} if Φj−1 6⊢D ¬ϕj
Φj−1 ∪ {¬ϕj} if Φj−1 ⊢D ¬ϕj
Φ′j :=
{
Φ′j−1 ∪ {¬¬ϕj} if Φ
′
j−1 6⊢D ¬ϕj
Φ′j−1 ∪ {¬ϕj} if Φ
′
j−1 ⊢D ¬ϕj
.
(2)
Finally, set M+D (Φ) :=
⋃+∞
j=1 Φj and M
−
D (Φ) :=
⋃+∞
j=1 Φ
′
j .
Remark 2.4.8.
• In general, M±D (Φ) depends also on the choice of α. However, since
we are not going to rely on this fact, we can go for the lighter nota-
tion.
• M±D (Φ) ⊇ Φ: M
+
D (Φ) and M
−
D (Φ) are both extensions of Φ.
• M+D (Φ) is obviously a minimal covering.
Remark 2.4.9. D ⊇ 258,ConD Φ⇒ ConDM
+
D (Φ).
Proof. Referring to 2.4.7, each Φj is recursively D-consistent: ConΦj−1 ⇒
ConΦj, as seen by applying first thesis of 2.4.5 to first branch of (2) and
second to second. Since the Φj’s are concentric, any finite subset ofM
+
D (Φ)
is included in some Φj and thus consistent. ThusM
+
D (Φ) is consistent. 
2.5. The Henkin model. Now a construction procedure for a model of a
given sets of formulas Φ is exhibited. Care is taken upon always specifying
which derivation rules we will be using from time to time; this issue is closely
related to the study of the minimal requirements Φ must obey in order to
be able to apply such procedure.
The process is in three steps: first Φ is enlarged to a somehow maximal
family, then the latter’s good properties are exploited to build the needed
interpretation, and finally to show that this interpretation is a model for the
derived family, and thus also for the starting subfamily.
2.5.1. Building an interpretation. Fix a formal structure S. The free inter-
pretation
(
T S, ωS
)
(cfr. C.1.1) can always be built, the matter is how to
extend it to negative-arity symbols of S. This can obviously, as discussed
in C.1.1, be done anyhow one wants, but in the present situation we have Φ
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to guide us in the task in a natural way: set
f : #−1
(
Z
−
)
∋ s 7→
((
t1, . . . , t−#(s)
)
7→
{
⊤ if s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t−#(s) ∈ Φ
⊥ else
)
and call IΦ :=
(
T S, ωfS
)
(cfr C.1.1). Note that IΦ satisfies (is a model of)
Φ ∩
⋃
s∈#−1(Z−)
◦
(
{s} ×
(
T S
)|#(s)|)
= Φ ∩
{
ϕ ∈ FS0 | ϕ(1 : 1) /∈ {≡}
}
while the atomic formulas of Φ starting with ≡ are satisfied if and only if
they are literal identities, i.e. of the form ≡ tt for some t in T S. At this
time, nothing can be said about higher-order formulas, because no request
on Φ has been done yet. Now we fix one problem a time, starting from
basics and trying to accomodate into the model given by Φ first the atomic
formulas with ≡ as a first character. This first step alone will actually get
most of the work done.
The idea is to apply the quotient construction introduced in (11) according
to the natural equivalence relation Φ can give as soon as it is rich enough in
formulas.
That is, define the binary relation E(Φ,D) on T
S as
t1E(Φ,D)t2 ⇔ Φ ⊢D≡ t1t2,
where D is a finite set of deduction rules.
Lemma 2.5.1.
(1) If D includes 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4 rules (that is, D ⊇ 15), then
E(Φ,D) is an equivalence relation over T
S.
(2) If, moreover, Φ is D-expanded (see 2.4.1), E(Φ,D) is preserved through
ω(S,Φ) (cfr. (10) ).
Proof.
(1) The three properties of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity to be
shown to establish first part of the thesis correspond to show the
derivability of the respective sequents:
≡ t1t1
≡ t1t2 ≡ t2t1
≡ t1t2 ≡ t2t3 ≡ t1t3
The first sequent derives directly from a rule assumed to belong to
D.
The second one can be derived using just the two rules: reflexivity
rule gives the sequent ≡ t1t1 which can be seen as [≡ x1t1]
t1
x1
(here
x1 is supposed not to occur in t1). Antecedent rule then produces the
sequent ≡ t1t2 [≡ x1t1]
t1
x1
, which yields, through substitution rule,
≡ t1t2 [≡ x1t1]
t2
x1
=≡ t1t2 ≡ t2t1.
For the last sequent, start deriving the sequent ≡ t1t2 ≡ t2t3 ≡
t1t2=≡ t1t2 ≡ t2t3[≡ t1x1]
t2
x1
(assuming x1 not occurring in t1) via
assumption rule, and then ≡ t1t2 ≡ t2t3 ≡ t1t3 via substitution rule.
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(2) Let s ∈ #−1 (Z \ {0}) and t1, . . . , t|#(s)|, t
′
1, . . . , t
′
|#(s)| ∈ T
S be
given such that Φ ⊢D≡ tjt
′
j. By expansion hypothesis, we can
strengthen this to ≡ tjt
′
j ∈ Φ. As stated in (10), we must show
that
ω(S,Φ) (s)
((
t1, . . . , t|#(s)|
))
E′(Φ,D)ω(S,Φ) (s)
((
t′1, . . . , t
′
|#(s)|
))
(3)
Let us go by cases.
# (s) > 0:: Condition (3) becomes
Φ ⊢D≡ s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s)s ◦ t
′
1 ◦ . . . ◦ t
′
#(s)
⊢D≡ s◦t1◦. . .◦t#(s)s◦t1◦. . .◦t#(s) by reflexivity of equivalence
rule of D. From this sequent we obtain the sequent ≡ t1t
′
1 . . . ≡
t#(s)t
′
#(s) ≡ s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s)s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s) =≡ t1t
′
1 . . . ≡
t#(s)t
′
#(s)
[
≡ s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s)s ◦ x1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s)
]
t1
x1
by antecedent
rule of D, and then
≡ t1t
′
1 . . . ≡ t#(s)t
′
#(s)
[
≡ s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s)s ◦ x1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s)
] t′1
x1
by substitution rule of D. Here, always using variable x1 which
is assumed not to occur in any tj or t
′
j, we iterate this procedure
to obtain the sequent
≡ t1t
′
1 . . . ≡ t#(s)t
′
#(s) ≡ s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s)s ◦ t
′
1 ◦ . . . ◦ t
′
#(s)
Now, since Φ is expanded, all the formulas ≡ tjt
′
j belong to Φ,
so the last sequent implies that Φ ⊢D≡ s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s)s ◦ t
′
1 ◦
. . . ◦ t′#(s).
# (s) < 0:: Condition (3) becomes
ω(S,Φ) (s)
((
t1, . . . , t−#(s)
))
= ω(S,Φ) (s)
((
t′1, . . . , t
′
−#(s)
))
To make argument easier, we split the it into a further pair of
subcases.
s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t−#(s) ∈ Φ:
We must prove that s ◦ t′1 ◦ . . . ◦ t
′
−#(s) ∈ Φ.
Starting sequent s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t−#(s) s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t−#(s)
is obtained using assumption rule. Then by antecedence:
s◦t1◦. . .◦t−#(s) ≡ t1t
′
1 s◦t1◦. . .◦t−#(s) and finally by sub-
stitution, as already done in this proof: s◦t1◦. . .◦t−#(s) ≡
t1t
′
1 s◦ t
′
1 ◦ . . .◦ t−#(s). Iterating antecedence/substitution
we get our ultimate sequent s◦t1 ◦. . .◦t−#(s) ≡ t1t
′
1 . . . ≡
t−#(s)t
′
−#(s) s◦t
′
1◦. . .◦t
′
−#(s), which says Φ ⊢D s◦t
′
1◦. . .◦
t′−#(s) since s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t−#(s) ≡ t1t
′
1 . . . ≡ t−#(s)t
′
−#(s)
are all formulas of Φ.
s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t−#(s) /∈ Φ:
Suppose that s◦t′1◦ . . .◦t
′
−#(s) ∈ Φ. Since Φ contains also
swapped equivalences ≡ t′1t1 . . . ≡ t−#(s)t
′
−#(s) (this can
be shown using just reflexivity, antecedent and substitu-
tion rules), the same last argument could be repeated to
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show Φ ⊢D s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t−#(s) and thus (by expansion
hypothesis) s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t−#(s) ∈ Φ, a contradiction.

Ultimately, we have cascaded the three constructions of C.1.1: first free
interpretation, then extension of free interpretation with a f derived from Φ,
and finally (with 2.5.1 stating the constraints on D and the bounds between
D and Φ needed to take this last step) quotient interpretation, to get the
following definition.
Definition 2.5.2 (Henkin model). If D ⊇ 15 and Φ is any D-expanded set
of formulas of FS , set
I(Φ,D) :=
IΦ
E(Φ,D)
This interpretation is the tool needed to work out satisfiability, and thus
completeness, results in the sequel.
2.5.2. Making it a model.
Lemma 2.5.3. D ⊇ 15, Φ D-expanded, ϕ ∈ FS0 . Then
I(Φ,D) |= ϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ
Proof. By cases according to the first character of ϕ.
Case ϕ =≡ t1t2:
I |= ϕ⇔ I (t1) = I (t2)⇔ IΦ (t1)E(Φ,D)IΦ (t2)
⇔ t1E(Φ,D)t2 ⇔ Φ ⊢D≡ t1t2 ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ
Case ϕ = st1 . . . t−#(s) for some s ∈ #
−1 (Z−):
I |= ϕ⇔ ω(S,Φ) (s)
(
IΦ (t1) , . . . ,IΦ
(
t−#(s)
))
= ⊤
⇔ ω(S,Φ) (s)
(
t1, . . . , t−#(s)
)
= ⊤ ⇔ st1 . . . t−#(s) ∈ Φ

Note how consistency is not at all involved in 2.5.3’s statement and proof.
That is a weak result, meaning that it works for any kind of Φ. Of course,
if Φ is inconsistent, I(Φ,D) will behave inconsistently, too:
Remark 2.5.4 (see [3] for definitions). Given a formula ϕ, one can consider
the set of the minterms occurring in each of its prime implicants, and thus
obtain a family of sets of the form {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}, with each ϕj in F
S
0 ⊔¬
(
FS0
)
.
It is easy to check that I(Φ,D) |= ϕ if and only if at least one set of this family
is included in Φ.
Previous remark hints at the fact that Φ must itself satisfy some addi-
tional “completeness” request if one wants I(Φ,D) to be an interpretation for
the whole Φ. That is why 2.5.6 makes the request of minimal covering.
In a similar way, one has to request witness-completeness for Φ in the fol-
lowing precise sense.
Definition 2.5.5. Φ is witness-furnished iff ∃xmϕ ∈ Φ ⇒ there is t ∈
T S| ϕ t
xm
∈ Φ.
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One might say that to give an interpretation of non-atomic formulas, Φ
must be in some sense complete according to both ∃ and ↓, which are the
only two possible starting characters of a non-atomic formulas.
However, ∃-completeness can be consider of a more technical, and less fun-
damental, nature than ↓-completeness. Indeed, the former will be shown to
be dispensable in final result, and only needed to perform the proof. What’s
more, if one wants to extend present result to the case of uncountable sym-
bol set S (not treated here), he finds that is ↓ completion, not the need
of witnesses, which poses the hardest challenges and forces resorting to the
axiom of choice to do what here is done in 2.4.7 relying on countability of
S. See [1].
Lemma 2.5.6. D ⊇ 223, Φ D-expanded, Φ minimal covering, Φ witness-
furnished, ϕ ∈ FS. Then
I(Φ,D) |= ϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ
Proof. By induction on the depth n of ϕ (as defined in B.2.5). Triggering
case n = 0 is granted by 2.5.3. Taking for proven the thesis for formulas of
depth ≤ n, consider a formula ϕ of depth n+ 1. By cases:
ϕ is of the form ↓ ϕ1ϕ2::
I |=↓ ϕ1ϕ2 ⇔ I 6|= ϕ1 and I 6|= ϕ2 ⇔
{ϕ1, ϕ2} ∩ Φ = ∅
∗
⇔ Φ ⊢↓ ϕ1ϕ1 and Φ ⊢↓ ϕ2ϕ2
⇔ Φ ⊢↓ ϕ1ϕ2,
last equivalence being given by NOR and NOT introduction rules,
one per direction, and marked equivalence being the one requiring
minimal covering hypothesis. The remaining steps go by definition
and by inductive hypothesis.
ϕ is of the form ∃xmϕ::
I |= ∃xmϕ⇔ I
[t]
xm
|= ϕ for some t ∈ T S
⇔ I |= ϕ
t
xm
for some t ∈ T S ⇔ ϕ
t
xm
∈ Φ for some t ∈ T S
⇔ ∃xmϕ ∈ Φ
Last equivalence stands on application of 2.1.5 followed by use of
expansion hypothesis (⇒) and on assumption that Φ is witness-
furnished (⇐). Here [t] is the equivalence class of the term t ac-
cording to E(Φ,D). As a passing note, the t occurring in previous
equivalence chain is always the same, although this accident is not
exploited.

Lemma 2.5.7. D ⊇ 310 or D ⊇ 566; given Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FS, xm ∈ X:
ConΦ ∪ ∃xmϕ⇒ ConΦ ∪
{
ϕ
xn
xm
}
∀xn ∈ X \ free (Φ ∪ {∃xmϕ})
YET ANOTHER PROOF OF GO¨DEL’S COMPLETENESS THEOREM 11
Proof. Name Φ1 := Φ ∪ ∃xmϕ; Φ2 := Φ ∪
{
ϕ xn
xm
}
to ease things up.
The following derivation:
≡ x1x1
(2.1.3)
≡ x1x1
∃x1 ≡ x1x1
(2.1.5)
says ∅ ⊢D ∃x1 ≡ x1x1, and thus Φ1 ⊢D ∃x1 ≡ x1x1 and Φ2 ⊢D ∃x1 ≡ x1x1
by (2.1.2). By contradiction now the negation of the latter formula is ex-
hibited to be derivable from Φ1, which on the other hand is granted to be
consistent.
Suppose indeed that Φ2 ⊢D ¬∃x1 ≡ x1x1.
Then there is a sequent Γ ϕ xn
xm
¬∃x1 ≡ x1x1, with Γ finite subset of Φ.
Now, since xn ∈ X\free (Φ ∪ {∃xmϕ}), xn does not occur free in Γ ∃xmϕ ¬∃x1 ≡
x1x1, permitting
Γ ϕ xn
xm
¬∃x1 ≡ x1x1
Γ ∃xmϕ ¬∃x1 ≡ x1x1
(2.1.6),
so that Φ1 ⊢D ¬∃x1 ≡ x1x1.
In the end, it must be Φ2 6 ⊢D¬∃x1 ≡ x1x1. This, using lastly (2.4.6) (which
in turn employs a contradiction rule), equates to Φ2 being consistent. 
Lemma 2.5.8 (Witness Adjunction Construction). D ⊇ 310 or D ⊇ 566;
if Φ ⊆ FS is D-consistent and X \ free (Φ) is countable, there is WD (Φ) ⊆
FS , WD (Φ) ⊇ Φ such that
• WD (Φ) is consistent and witness-furnished.
• Every D-consistent superset of WD (Φ) is witness-furnished.
Proof. The set of formulas starting with ∃ is countable with its superset FS,
and can thus be written as
⊔
j∈Z+
{
∃xα(j)ϕβ(j)
}
.
Define Φ0 := Φ, and then recursively for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
kj := min
{
l ∈ Z+| xl ∈ X \ free
(
Φj−1 ∪
{
∃xα(j)ϕβ(j)
})}
(4)
Φj :=
{
Φj−1 ∪
{
ϕβ(j)
xkj
xα(j)
}
if ConΦj−1 ∪
{
∃xα(j)ϕβ(j)
}
Φj−1 otherwise
.(5)
First, the soundness of this algorithm can be checked recursively by showing
that each X \ free (Φj) is countable, so that in particular the least element
in (4) is taken over a non-empty subset of Z+. This easy step is omitted
here.
Secondly, each Φj is easily proven consistent by applying 2.5.7 to first branch
of (5) each time it is employed. Also, since Φ0 ⊆ Φ1 ⊆ Φ2 ⊆ . . ., each finite
subset of WD (Φ) :=
⋃
j∈Z+ Φj is a subset of some Φj , and thus consistent.
This makesWD (Φ) consistent as well. Note that the outcome of the present
construction can depend on how the exist statements are initially sorted, i.e.
on α and β (cfr. the parallel situation for M+(Φ) in 2.4.8).
Finally, the last thesis descends from the fact that any consistent superset
of WD (Φ) cannot contain any exist-formula whose witness hasn’t already
been added in (5). 
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3. Putting it all together. Satisfiability and completeness
theorems. Adequacy of sequent calculus
Proposition 3.0.9 (Fundamental satisfiability result).
Hypothesis:
(1) D ⊇ 511
(2) Φ ⊆ FS is D-consistent.
(3) X \ free (Φ) is countable.
Thesis: Φ is satisfiable.
Proof.
(1) D contains enough rules to allow building Φ′ :=M+D (WD (Φ)); this
is the only step in which hypotheses 3 and 2 are used.
(2) Now Φ′ is consistent becauseWD preserves consistency and thanks to
2.4.9. It is a covering, too (2.4.8). So, by definition, it is D-maximal
and, descending from 2.4.4, thus both expanded and a minimal cov-
ering.
(3) At this point, expandedness permits (see 2.5.1 and 10) the construc-
tion of the Henkin interpretation I(Φ′,D).
(4) Finally, Φ′ is witness-furnished thanks to last thesis of 2.5.8, so we
can apply 2.5.6 and get that Φ′ is satisfied by I(Φ′,D).
And so Φ is. 
It is time, in the end, to see that hypothesis 3 was a mere technical device
to produce the proof of 3.0.9, which can be restated without it, now that it
has been granted.
Theorem 3.0.10 (Satisfiability Theorem).
Hypothesis:
(1) D ⊇ 511
(2) Φ ⊆ FS is D-consistent.
Thesis: Φ is satisfiable.
Proof. The idea is to cast all the free variables occurring in Φ into new
constants to adjoin to S, so to be able to apply 3.0.9. Consider S′ :=
S⊔{c1, c2, . . .}. For each ϕ ∈ Φ build the formula ϕ
′ obtained by substituting
each occurrence of a free variable xj with cj . Call Φ
′ the set of formulas
thus obtained.
Φ′ is consistent:: Take any finite subset {ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n}, and compare
it with the corresponding {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}. The latter is satisfiable as a
set of S-formulas by virtue of 3.0.9, and be I a model for it. Turn
I into a S′-interpretation I ′ by setting I ′ (cj) := I (xj). Thanks to
how we defined ϕ′, we have I ′ (ϕ′) = I (ϕ) = ⊤, so I ′ is a model for
{ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ
′
n}. Thus the whole Φ
′ is consistent.
Let then I ′′ be a model of Φ′. Since free (Φ′) = ∅, we can request that
I ′′(xj) = I
′′(cj) ∀j ∈ Z
+. By the same reasoning done for I ′, it is shown
that I ′′ (ϕ′) = I ′′ (ϕ) = ⊤ ∀ϕ ∈ Φ.
So Φ is satisfiable. 
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Corollary 3.0.11. If 511 ⊆ D+ ⊆ D, then
ConD+ Φ⇔ ConD Φ
Proof. It suffices to show left-to-right implication.
ConD+ Φ implies there is a model I for Φ. Correctness of sequents of D
implies (2.2.1) that ConD Φ. 
As a major corollary of 3.0.10, we now show completeness of first-order
calculus. While the former is a constructive result, the latter is highly non-
constructive, as it is fundamentally derived from 3.0.10 using contradiction
rules.
Theorem 3.0.12 (Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem).
Hypothesis: D+ ⊇ 511, D ⊇ 1023, Φ |= ϕ.
Thesis:
(1) If ϕ is negative, then it is provable in D+.
(2) ϕ can be proved in D, and there exists a proof of it whose all
derivation rules except at most the last are in D+.
Proof.
(1) ϕ is of the form ¬ψ. By contradiction, suppose Φ 6⊢D+ ¬ψ. By 2.4.5,
ConD+ Φ ∪ {ψ}, thus, using 3.0.10, there is a model I for Φ ∪ {ψ},
so that I (ψ) = ⊤. But I is also a model of Φ, so by hypothesis
I (¬ψ) = ⊤.
(2) Φ |= ϕ ⇒ Φ |= ¬¬ϕ. Applying previous point, we find Φ ⊢D+ ¬¬ϕ.
Then we use rule (1) to finish.

Appendix A. Generalities on semigroups
Consider a semigroup (M, ◦). By virtue of its associativity, the binary
operation ◦ can be seen also as a function from
⋃+∞
j=2M
j into M . That is,
semigroup operation can unambiguously be applied to any n-ple, becoming
an overloaded function. When wanting to stress this, functional notation can
be employed: rather than using infix notation commonly adopted for semi-
group operation: x1 ◦ x2, one writes, for the generic n-ple: ◦ ((x1, . . . , xn)).
This will be handy in the sequel, besides being more adaptable to the vari-
able argument length just established. When, on the other hand, normal
infix (operational) notation is used, and clarity is safe, the operation symbol
◦ will be possibly omitted.
One can push things a little further: consider that in functional notation
the associativity is expressed thus:
◦ (◦ ({a})× {b}) = ◦ ({a} × {b}) ∀a ∈
+∞⋃
j=2
M j , b ∈
+∞⋃
j=1
M j .(6)
It then comes natural to extend the function ◦ to the whole
⋃+∞
j=1M
j domain
by letting ◦ (a) = a ∀a ∈M , because doing so (6) results extended as well.
So when ◦ is used in functional notation, it will be meant to denote this
latter extended function.
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Definition A.0.13. A n-ple (A1, . . . , An) of subsets of M is said unam-
biguous iff the restriction ◦|Qn
j=1Aj
is injective.
Remark A.0.14. Definition A.0.13 is satisfied in the trivial case of any of the
sets A1, . . . , An being empty (any function is injective on empty domain).
Definition A.0.15. A subset A ⊆ M is unambiguous iff ∀B ⊆ M (A,B)
is unambiguous; or, equivalently, iff (A,M) is unambiguous.
Remark A.0.16. If (A1, . . . , An) is a n-ple of not necessarily all distinct sub-
sets of M , each unambiguous, then

A, . . . , A︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
, B

 is unambiguous ∀B ⊆
M,n ∈ Z+, which implies that ◦
(∏n
j=1Aj
)
is unambiguous.
Proof. By induction on n. 
A.1. Unambiguous generators, homomorphic extensions and string
substitution. It is useful to have a set which somehow generates the whole
semigroup through its operation; even better if this can be done in only one
way.
Definition A.1.1. Call A ⊆ M a generator iff ◦
∣∣∣F+∞
j=1 A
j is onto M , an
unambiguous generator iff is a bijection on M .
Remark A.1.2. An unambiguous generator is a generator.
An unambiguous generator is indeed useful first of all because one can
extend a map on it onto the whole semigroup, in the expected manner.
Definition A.1.3 (Homomorphic extension). Given an unambiguous gen-
erator A ⊆M and f : A→M , set
f× :
+∞⊔
j=1
Aj ∋ (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (f (x1) , . . . , f (xn)) ∈
+∞⊔
j=1
M j
and define the homomorphic extension of f as
fA (y) := ◦
(
f×
((
◦
∣∣∣F+∞
j=1 A
j
)−1
(y)
))
It is easy to check that it is defined on the whole M and that it is an
extension of f . A.1.3 formally states what becomes the very intuitive
concept of substitution as soon as M is the free monoid over the alphabet
A, which will be the case of our interest in B.1: take any string and substitute
each occurrence in it of a certain letter with a certain string. In case f is
a finite substitution, i.e. there is a finite F = {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A such that
f
∣∣
A\F is the identity, which will be the case occurring in the sequel, we will
usually employ the alternative notation
ϕ
f(a1) . . . f(an)
a1 . . . an
:= fA (ϕ)
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Appendix B. Syntax
First-order syntax construction can be found in many references. Here,
it is quickly introduced as it will be the material for the whole treatment.
The subject is a standard one, so little remarks are added. There are some
non-standard variations here: first, only one logical operator symbol is used,
namely ↓ representing nor binary function (true if and only if both its ar-
guments are false); second, polish notation is adopted; and third, to save
words and symbols when having to distinguish between function, relation,
and constant symbols of the first-order alphabet, as a mere technical device,
we will associate to each symbol a signed-arity (#), whose sign immediately
tells about the matter; lastly, only one quantifier is used. These solutions
are aimed at simplifying tractation (especially in the proofs of sections ) and
making statements shorter, albeit maybe less readable at times.
B.1. Formal structure. A formal structure is a couple (S,#) made of an
arbitrary, possibly empty, set S (the symbol set) and of a function #: S → Z
called signed-arity. s ∈ S is named, respectively:
• A constant iff # (s) = 0
• A #(s)-ary function (or operation) symbol iff # (s) > 0
• A |#(s)|-ary relation symbol iff # (s) < 0,
so that S is partitioned into constant, function and relation symbols.
B.2. Terms and formulas. Take another infinite set X (the variables sym-
bol set) and a further, disjoint set {↓,≡,∃}, both disjoint with S. Call
S := S ⊔X ⊔ {↓,≡,∃}
the alphabet, and S ⊔X ⊔ {≡} ⊂ S the non-logical alphabet.
Consider the free semigroup (
S
+
, ◦
)
,
that is, the strings of one or more letters of S, with string concatenation ◦
as a semigroup operation.
Here is shown how to build a couple of subsets of this semigroup in a
way such that, when back to semantics, a meaning can be associated to
each element of those subsets. That is, the strings hereby constructed will
have the right structure to be meaningful when each of its characters gets
endowed with a ‘content’ and becomes a symbol of it. These strings are
indeed exactly all the strings enjoying this feature.
The last preparatory step is the extension of signed-arity function to all the
non-logical symbols, by defining
#(s) :=


#(s) s ∈ S
0 s ∈ X
−2 s ∈ {≡}
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Consider finally two auxiliary mappings τ, φ : 2S
+
→ 2S
+
acting the follow-
ing way:
τ : Y 7→ Y ∪
⋃
s∈#
−1
(Z+)
◦
(
{s} × Y #(s)
)
φ : Y 7→ Y ∪ ◦ ({↓} × Y × Y ) ∪ ◦ ({∃} ×X × Y )
Call terms of depth 0 (or atomic terms) the set T S0 := #
−1
({0}), and terms
of depth ≤ n ∈ Z+ the set
T Sn := τ
n
(
T S0
)
;
here τn is the n-th iterate of the function τ .
Call terms the union of the terms of any depth:
T S :=
⋃
j∈N
T Sj = lim
j→+∞
T Sj
Remark B.2.1. ∀n ∈ N T Sn ⊆ T
S
n+1 ⊆ T
S ⊆
(
#
−1
(N)
)+
Similarly, call formulas of depth 0 (or atomic formulas) the set
FS0 :=
⋃
s∈#
−1
(Z−)
◦

{s} × |#(s)|∏
j=1
T S

 ,
and formulas of depth ≤ n ∈ Z+ the image of FS0 throught the n-th iteration
of φ:
FSn := φ
n
(
FS0
)
.
Finally, call formulas the union of formulas of any depth :
FS :=
⋃
j∈N
FSj = lim
j→+∞
FSj .
Definition B.2.2. For concision’s sake, we will often use the shortcut char-
acter ¬ and write ¬ϕ instead of ↓ ϕϕ, where ϕ is any formula. One can also
consider ¬ as a meta-symbol denoting the mapping ϕ 7→↓ ϕϕ.
Of course, terms and formulas can be partitioned according to their depth
via obvious definitions:
Definition B.2.3.
T
S
0 := T
S
0 F
S
0 := F
S
0
T
S
n := T
S
n \ T
S
n−1 F
S
n := F
S
n \ F
S
n−1, n ∈ Z
+
Remark B.2.4.
•
{
T
S
n
}
n∈N
is a partition of T S .
• ∀n ∈ N
T
S
n+1 ⊆
⊔
s∈#−1(Z+)
◦
(
{s} ×
(
T Sn
)#(s))
⊆ T Sn+1(7)
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Now it is not hard to guess how the depth of a term or formula will be
introduced:
Definition B.2.5. The depth of a term t ∈ T S is min
({
n| t ∈ T Sn
})
or,
equivalently, the natural number n such that t ∈ T
S
n .
In the same manner, the depth of a formula ϕ ∈ FS is min
({
n| ϕ ∈ FSn
})
or, equivalently, the natural number n such that ϕ ∈ F
S
n .
Remark B.2.6. Alternatively, the depth of a formula can be recursively de-
fined as
depth
(
FS0
)
:= {0}
depth (↓ ϕ1ϕ2) := max (depth ({ϕ1, ϕ2})) + 1
depth (∃xϕ) := depth (ϕ) + 1,
and analogously for terms.
Remark B.2.7.
T S = T S0 ⊔
⊔
s∈#−1(Z+)
n∈N
(
◦
(
{s} ×
(
T Sn
)#(s))
∩ T
S
n+1
)
(8)
B.3. Subterms and subformulas.
Lemma B.3.1. ∀n ∈ N
T Sn+1 = T
S
0 ⊔
⋃
s∈#−1(Z+)
◦
(
{s} ×
(
T Sn
)#(s))
Lemma B.3.2. T Sn is unambiguous in S
+
∀n ∈ N.
Proof. By induction on n. Note that in a free semigroup any subset of
elements all of the same length is obviously unambiguous. So T S0 is unam-
biguous.
Now suppose ty = t′y′ =: z for some t, t′ ∈ T Sn+1 , y, y
′ ∈ S
+
, and to have
shown that T Sn is unambiguous: the goal is to trigger induction by showing
t = t′ and y = y′. Since t, t′ both have length at least 1, they both have a
first character, and this character is the first character of z. Call it s. Now
the proof is by cases on s.
# (s) = 0: By B.3.1 this means that both t, t′ ∈ T S0 , which is unam-
biguous, so t = t′ and y = y′.
# (s) ∈ Z+: By B.3.1 this means that both t, t′ ∈ ◦
(
{s} ×
(
T Sn
)#(s))
,
which is unambiguous by A.0.16, so t = t′ and y = y′.
By B.2.1 this parses all the possibilities. 
Theorem B.3.3. T S is unambiguous.
Proof. Suppose t, t′ ∈ T S and y, y′ ∈ S
+
are such that ty = t′y′. Call
n the greater among the depths of t and t′. Since t, t′ ∈ T Sn and T
S
n is
unambiguous, it must be t = t′ and y = y′. 
Now the mapping from a term to its ordered subterms is introduced.
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Definition B.3.4. For t ∈ T S define
SS (t) :=


t if t ∈ T S0
◦
∣∣∣∣∣∣„“TS#(t)−1”#(t(1:1))«

−1 (t (2 :)) else ,
where last assignment is sensible because
• As soon as # (t) ≥ 1
– t has length at least 2.
–
t (2 :) ∈ ◦
((
T S
#(t)−1
)#(t(1:1)))
– #(t (1 : 1)) ≥ 1
• the restriction is performed over a unambiguous domain
All the results of this section can be adapted and repeated for formulas.
Remark B.3.5.
• T S ∩ FS = ∅
• T S ⊔ FS is unambiguous.
Proof. Note that any string in T S ⊔ FS has length ≥ 1 and that the first
character of any term differs from the first character of any formula. This
grants both theses. 
So the operator SS can be extended to T
S ⊔ FS. (details todo)
B.4. Families of formulas. Let Φ be a generic subset of FS . The following
definitions have to do with how many formulas we can fit into Φ, especially
in the light of calculus of sequent defined in 2.1.
Definition B.4.1. Φ is said to be a covering iff ∀ϕ ∈ FS , {ϕ, ↓ ϕϕ}∩Φ 6= ∅
Definition B.4.2. Φ is said to be patently inconsistent iff ¬ (Φ) ∩ Φ 6= ∅,
that is, iff there is ϕ ∈ FS such that {ϕ, ↓ ϕϕ} ⊆ Φ.
Definition B.4.3. Φ is said to be a minimal covering iff ∀ϕ ∈ FS , {ϕ, ↓ ϕϕ}∩
Φ has cardinality 1 ⇔ Φ is a covering, while no proper subset of it is ⇔ Φ
is a covering and not patently inconsistent.
The two equivalences embedded in the above definition are immediate.
Appendix C. Semantics
C.1. Interpretations. Given a formal structure S, an interpretation of
S is a couple I := (A,ω), of which A (the universe of I) is a set and
ω : S ⊔X → A ⊔
⊔
n∈Z+
(
AA
n
⊔ {⊤,⊥}A
n
)
satisfies
ω (s) ∈ AA
n
⇔ #(s) = n ∈ Z+
ω (s) ∈ {⊤,⊥}A
n
⇔ #(s) = −n ∈ Z−
ω (s) ∈ A⇔ #(s) = 0
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If I := (A,ω) is an interpretation of the formal structure S, (A, ω|S) is
said to be an S-structure, and (A, ω|X) an assignment, so that giving an
S-structure and an assignment both over the same universe equals giving an
interpretation of S.
C.1.1. Standard constructions.
Free interpretation. For any set S of algebraic symbols, there is a standard
interpretation
(
T S , ωS
)
of the subset S≥ := #−1 (N) ⊆ S of algebraic sym-
bols, with universe T S = T S
≥
; just take
ωS(s) :=
{
s #(s) = 0(
t1, . . . , t#(s)
)
7→ s ◦ t1 ◦ . . . ◦ t#(s) #(s) > 0
(9)
The only checking to do, namely⋃
s∈#−1(Z+)
ω (s)
((
T S
)#(s))
⊆ T S ,
is easy.
Lemma C.1.1. The free interpretation is the only identical interpretation
of S≥, in that it satisfies I (t) = t ∀t ∈ T S.
Arbitrary extensions of the free interpretation. (T S , ωS) can be extended to
an interpretation of the whole S with substantial arbitrarity by choosing
ωS (s) in {⊤,⊥}
(TS)
(−#(s))
for each s ∈ #−1 (Z−). That is, given any map-
ping f : #−1 (Z−) ∋ s 7→ f (s) ∈ {⊤,⊥}(T
S)
(−#(s))
, one can associate to it
an interpretation of (S,#) by taking the free interpretation of S≥ and ex-
tending ωS as just done, to a function we denote with ω
f
S . Note that giving
such a f is equivalent to giving a binary partition of the string set⋃
s∈#−1(Z−)
◦
(
{s} ×
(
T S
)|#(s)|)
⊂ FS0
Quotient interpretation. Suppose to have an S-interpretation I = (A,ω) and
an equivalence relation E (whose projector let be denoted by pE : A→ A/E)
preserved through ω, which means
∀s ∈ #−1 (Z \ {0})(10)
ajEa
′
j , j = 1, . . . , |#(s)| ⇒ ω (s)
((
a1, . . . , a|#(s)|
))
E′ω (s)
((
a′1, . . . , a
′
|#(s)|
))
,
where E′ is the equivalence relation on A ⊔ {⊤,⊥} obtained by setting
E′ := E ⊔ {(⊥,⊥) , (⊤,⊤)}. This property permits building the projected
function
ω
E
(s) :=

pE(ω(s)) #(s) = 0(
pE(a1), . . . , pE(a#(s))
)
7→ pE
(
ω(s)
((
a1, . . . , a#(s)
)))
#(s) > 0(
pE(a1), . . . , pE(a#(s))
)
7→ ω(s)
((
a1, . . . , a#(s)
))
#(s) < 0
(11)
It is obvious that I
E
:= (A/E,ω/E) is still an S-interpretation.
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Assignment mutation. Denote with I α the interpretation (A,ω) obtained
from I = (A,ω) by setting∗ ω := (ω |S ) ⊔ {(xm, α (xm)) ,m ∈ Z+}, where
α ∈ AX . Less formally, we keep the structure of the interpretation while
changing the assignment of variables symbols. The case of interest to us will
be that of α equating ω |X except for a finite subset {xj1 , . . . , xjn} of X, in
which case we write
I
α(xj1) . . . α (xjn)
xj1 . . . xjn
:= I α
C.2. Interpretation of non-atomic strings. An interpretation assigns
a meaning to atomic terms and to each operation symbol. Obviously this
suffices to recursively assign a meaning (i.e. a value in the universe of the
interpretation) to each term by revisiting what done in B.2 and calculating
the value of a term from the value of its (lower-depth) subterms.
Once done this, one can reiterate an analogous process, and recursively as-
sign a meaning (i.e. a value in {⊤,⊥}) to each formula by regarding it as
made of boolean symbols and subformulas, and ultimately of boolean sym-
bols and atomic formulas, and in turn the latter as made of relation symbols,
≡’s and terms.
Formally, this is done by extending ω of the given interpretation I := (A,ω)
first to all T S and then to all FS , as follows. Before formalization, it should
be noted that it is customary to abuse a bit the notation and use the inter-
pretation symbol I altogether in place of the proper function symbol ω, so
one can write statements like, e.g., I (t) ∈ A and I (ϕ) = ⊤.
Definition C.2.1 (Recursive interpretation of terms). Define, for t, t1, . . . , tn ∈
T S0 :
I (t) := ω (t) I ((t1, . . . , tn)) := (I (t1) , . . . ,I (tn)) .
Then recursively†:
I (t) := ω (t (1 : 1)) (I (S (t))) I ((t1, . . . , tn)) := (I (t1) , . . . ,I (tn)) .
Definition C.2.2 (Interpretation of atomic formulas).
I (ϕ) :=


ω (ϕ (1 : 1)) (I (S (ϕ))) if ϕ (1 : 1) 6=≡
⊤ if ϕ =≡ t1t2 and I (t1) = I (t2)
⊥ otherwise
Definition C.2.3 (Recursive interpretation of non-atomic formulas).
I (↓ ϕ1ϕ2) := ⊤ ⇔ I(ϕ1) =⊥ and I(ϕ2) =⊥
I (∃xmϕ) := ⊤ ⇔ I
a
xm
(ϕ) = ⊤ for some a ∈ A
Definition C.2.4 (Satisfaction and model). An interpretation I satisfies
Φ ⊆ FS , otherwise said that I is a model of Φ, iff I (Φ) = {⊤}. This is
expressed in symbols as I |= Φ.
∗Here ω and ω are considered as relations, which permits seeing them as subsets of the
cartesian product of domain with codomain.
†See B.3.4 for the definition of S . Basically, it returns all subterms and subformulas of
a given term/formula into a n-ple.
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Appendix D. Table of notations and meta-symbols
⊔ disjoint union
× cartesian product of two sets (infix)∏n
j=1Aj cartesian product of n sets
‡
An shortcut for
∏n
j=1A
AB the family of functions mapping set B into set A
f |A restriction of f to subdomain A
2A the power set of A
s (1 : 1) the first character of the string s
s (2 :) the unique string such that s(1 : 1)s(2 :) = s
N the non-negative integers
⊤,⊥ semantic values of true and false for classical logic
S+ the free semigroup generated by S,
i.e. the non-empty finite strings over the alphabet S
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‡The two writings
“Qm
j=1 Aj
”
×
“Qn
j=1 Am+j
”
and
Qm+n
j=1 Aj will denote the same
set. That is, cartesian product is considered associative, although formally this is a slight
formal abuse. On the other hand, here the Aj ’s will always be such as not to pose problems
with this abuse.
As a convention,
Q1
j=1 Aj is A1 itself.
